lum_ccc_rust/crates/ccc-crypto-wolfssl/src/mac.rs

//! MAC (Message Authentication Code) implementations via wolfCrypt.
//!
//! Provides HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384, HMAC-SHA512, and BLAKE2b-MAC.
//! All `verify_mac` implementations use constant-time comparison to prevent
//! timing side-channels.

use ccc_crypto_core::{algorithms::MacAlgorithm, error::CryptoError};

// wolfCrypt hash type constants matching `enum wc_HashType` in hash.h.
const WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA256: i32 = 8;
const WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA384: i32 = 9;
const WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA512: i32 = 10;

// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Public entry points
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Compute a MAC tag over `data` using the specified algorithm and `key`.
pub fn compute_mac(
    algo: MacAlgorithm,
    key: &[u8],
    data: &[u8],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
    match algo {
        MacAlgorithm::HmacSha256 => hmac(WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA256, key, data, 32),
        MacAlgorithm::HmacSha384 => hmac(WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA384, key, data, 48),
        MacAlgorithm::HmacSha512 => hmac(WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA512, key, data, 64),
        MacAlgorithm::Blake2bMac => blake2b_mac(key, data),
        MacAlgorithm::Poly1305   =>
            Err(CryptoError::UnsupportedAlgorithm(
                "Poly1305 standalone MAC is not exposed in this Phase".into()
            )),
    }
}

/// Verify a MAC tag in constant time.
///
/// Returns `Ok(true)` if the tag matches, `Ok(false)` if it does not.
/// Never returns `Err` for a tag mismatch — only for structural errors.
pub fn verify_mac(
    algo: MacAlgorithm,
    key: &[u8],
    data: &[u8],
    mac: &[u8],
) -> Result<bool, CryptoError> {
    let expected = compute_mac(algo, key, data)?;
    Ok(constant_time_eq(&expected, mac))
}

// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// HMAC
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// HMAC using wolfCrypt's `wc_HmacSetKey` / `wc_HmacUpdate` / `wc_HmacFinal`.
fn hmac(
    hash_type: i32,
    key: &[u8],
    data: &[u8],
    out_len: usize,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
    let mut out = vec![0u8; out_len];

    unsafe {
        let mut hmac_ctx: crate::sys::Hmac = std::mem::zeroed();

        let ret = crate::sys::wc_HmacSetKey(
            &mut hmac_ctx,
            hash_type,
            key.as_ptr(),
            key.len() as u32,
        );
        if ret != 0 {
            return Err(CryptoError::InvalidKey(format!("wc_HmacSetKey returned {}", ret)));
        }

        let ret = crate::sys::wc_HmacUpdate(
            &mut hmac_ctx,
            data.as_ptr(),
            data.len() as u32,
        );
        if ret != 0 {
            return Err(CryptoError::InternalError(format!("wc_HmacUpdate returned {}", ret)));
        }

        let ret = crate::sys::wc_HmacFinal(
            &mut hmac_ctx,
            out.as_mut_ptr(),
        );
        if ret != 0 {
            return Err(CryptoError::InternalError(format!("wc_HmacFinal returned {}", ret)));
        }

        crate::sys::wc_HmacFree(&mut hmac_ctx);
    }

    Ok(out)
}

// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// BLAKE2b-MAC (keyed BLAKE2b)
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Keyed BLAKE2b-512 used as a MAC.
///
/// Key length must be 1–64 bytes (wolfCrypt limitation).
/// Output is always 64 bytes (BLAKE2b-512 full digest length).
fn blake2b_mac(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
    if key.is_empty() || key.len() > 64 {
        return Err(CryptoError::InvalidKey(
            "BLAKE2b-MAC: key must be 1–64 bytes".into()
        ));
    }

    let mut out = vec![0u8; 64];

    unsafe {
        // wolfCrypt: wc_Blake2b(blake2b, out, outLen, key, keyLen, data, dataSz)
        // Using the simplified one-shot Blake2bHash wrapper.
        let ret = crate::sys::wc_Blake2bHash(
            out.as_mut_ptr(),
            64u32,
            key.as_ptr(),
            key.len() as u32,
            data.as_ptr(),
            data.len() as u32,
        );
        if ret != 0 {
            return Err(CryptoError::InternalError(
                format!("wc_Blake2bHash returned {}", ret)
            ));
        }
    }

    Ok(out)
}

// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Constant-time comparison
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Constant-time byte-slice equality comparison.
///
/// Returns `false` immediately if lengths differ (safe — length is not secret
/// for fixed-size HMAC tags).
fn constant_time_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
    if a.len() != b.len() {
        return false;
    }
    // Accumulate XOR differences; the branch is on the final accumulated value
    // only, not on any individual byte.
    let diff: u8 = a.iter().zip(b.iter()).fold(0u8, |acc, (x, y)| acc | (x ^ y));
    diff == 0
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::constant_time_eq;

    #[test]
    fn ct_eq_same() {
        assert!(constant_time_eq(b"hello", b"hello"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn ct_eq_different() {
        assert!(!constant_time_eq(b"hello", b"Hello"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn ct_eq_different_lengths() {
        assert!(!constant_time_eq(b"hi", b"hello"));
    }
}